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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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clarify the situation. It was indeed soon to become clear, but in favour
of Russia.
After the conference in Moscow, there seemed no longer any point in
holding Dr. Benes in England when he was so anxious to offer his country
as a vassal to Stalin. On December 12, Moscow announced the Treaty
with Dr. Benes., ia which the sc close and friendly collaboration after the
re-establishment of peace ..." was mentioned. This Treaty had put
Czecho-Slovakia at the mercy of Moscow to such a degree that the
Russians did not even argue over the fate of the 700^000 Carpathian
Ruthenians in the frame of the Czecho-Slovakian State. Moscow, who
had claimed the Polish Ruthenians on racial grounds as the kin of the
Ukrainians in the U.S.S.R., was apparently indifferent to this group of
Ruthenian people, although the threat of the annexation of Carpathian
Ruthenia was later to prove useful when the Czechs showed a reluctance
to carry out the orders of the Kremlin. The  union 3 of Carpathian
Ruthenia with the Soviets seemed hardly necessary at this point> when
Dr. Benes had, in fact, subordinated all Czecho-Slovakia to Russia.*
The Russo-Benes Treaty, veiled in its vague clauses, gave little away.
Afterwards in his message to the Czecho-Slovak State Council on
February 3., 1944, Dr. Benes said that the time had not yet come to " exa-
mine concretely the matters " which were negotiated at Moscow, matters
about which a cc mutual understanding " had been reached. Amongst
these c matters' was an agreement amplifying Article 4 of the Treaty,
which had stipulated that the two Powers " shall develop their economic
relations on the largest possible scale." The Czecho-Slovak industries,
mines and sources of hydraulic energy were to be nationalised ; the Czech
war industries were to work for the Russian and Czecho-Slovak armies;
war production was to be standardised so that it would conform with the
Russian war production; a new Czecho-Slovak Army was to be raised
and, " in the future interests of Czecho-Slovakia," organised, trained
and equipped after the Red Army standards. " In the interests of
democracy and for the extirpation of German influences," educational
(political) officers were to be introduced into all units. The Czecho-
* The policy of Dr. Benes* Government was a repetition on a larger scale of its
policy during the First Great War, the most extreme points being more strongly
underlined beneath the influence of a stronger Russia. Dr. Benes interpreted this
policy in connection with Poland in his book Smysl Ceskoslovenska Revoluce (The
Sense of the Czecho-Slovak Revolution), Prague, 1924:
In a war against the Central Powers (German} and Austria) we need the Poles,
and the reason for this war has compelled us to recognise Poland's rights. En-
deavouring to have our rights acknowledged, we must acknowledge the rights of the
Poles lest we ourselves morally lose our own. But, to give proof of our loyalty to
our friends (viz., the Russians) we had to oppose their essential, anti-Russian
policy. There were moments when Russia, because of Poland, adopted a danger-
ous attitude towards the Allies. Briand had had to tear the frst concession for
Poland from Russia. In a short time, because of Poland and internal political
reasons, the danger arose that Russia would even conclude a separate peace with
Germany. I state impartially, that the Allies were inclined to solve certain
questions in a manner which was bound not to satisfy the Poles.